A concrete example
In the following, we propose a sequence of specific questions concerning lexica.I cohesions (I,(') . coherence relations (CR), rhetorical relations (RIR), speech acts (SA), and conversa.tioual maxiu~s (C,M); more specifically, we intend to demonstrate the following strata • X coherence relation encompasses Y lexical cohesion (CR > LC).
• X rhetorical relation encompasses Y coherence relation (RR > CR).
• X speech act is achieved by Y rhetorical relation (SA > RR).
• X relevance maxim is obeyed by Y speech act (RM > SA).
Let's look at an example which is composed for an independent purpose; It is taken froln (Man. and Thompson, 1986 ):
($1) I love to collect classic automobiles. ($2) My favorite car is my 1887 Duryea.
First, let's observe that the semantic/propositional interpretation of SI and $2 yields th(, lid lowing (main) propositions:
That is, I love antique automobiles and my favorite car is the 1887 Duryea. By detecting the following lexical cohesions (between the words denoting the concepts):
We conclude the following coherence relation, Exemplification(S2, S1) -(F1) since as (Hobbs, 1985) defines it, we can KN-CR-I: Infer p(A) from S1 and p(a.) from $2, where a is a member or subset of A in our case, 'p' is 'LOVE' (or 'FAVORITE') and 'A' is the set of automobiles a.nd 'a' is th (' ('a.,' (i,y 1887 Duryea) . Now, we have demonstrated the connection between coherence relations a.nd lexical cohesi(,lls. Let's look at how this is connected to rhetorical relations and speech acts. First, we need to (,xl.eml the interpretation of $1 and $2 from purely propositional to including prol)ositional attitudes (( 'f. (Cohen and Levesque, 1990) , (Wu and Lytinen, 1991) and (Wu and Lytiuen, 1992) ),
That is, the speaker (spkr) 'believes,' as well as 'stated,' that S1 and $2. In order to conceive th,' intention behind the speaker's making $2, it is reasonable to assume that MBEL(Hr, Spkr, ?BEL(Hr, LOVE(Spkr, { a] OLD(a) & AUTOMOBILE(a) }))) - (F3) That is, the speaker and the hearer (Hr) mutually believe (MBEL) that the hearer weakly believes (?BEL) S1. Thus, in order to facilitate the "acceptance" of S1, the speaker uses $2 as an 'evidence' to support S1. That is, the following speech act and rhetorical relation are achieved simultaneously.
ASSERT(Spkr, S1) and Evidence(S2, S1)
The Evidence rhetorical relation is achieved through associating the following knowledge concerning persuasiveness and the Exemplification coherence relation (an instance of which is recognized in F1):
(KN-RR-1) IF the speaker provides more detailed information about a fact P (such as stating an example of P) THEN the hearer is more obliged to believe P (because the speaker really wants him to believe P)
Once the Evidence rhetorical relation is recognized, the hearer recognizes that the speaker really wants him to believe P from the THEN-part of KN-RR-i:
WANT(Spkr, Hr, BEL(Hr, LOVE(Spkr, ( a[ OLD(a) & AUTOMOBILE(a) })))-(F4)
Based on F2, F3 and F4, the hearer has recognized, according to Searle, the sincerity, the prep¢tra-tory, and the essential conditions of the Assertion speech act, respectively. Together with the Evidence rhetorical relation, it is clear that the speaker is making an assertion. Now, the last question remains as which relevance maxim has been obeyed during the a bov,~ process. According to (Sperber and Wilson, 1986) , relevance is obeyed by producing the following contextual effects (KN-RMs) (1)enhancing a statement (2) canceling a statement (3)introducing ;t statement. Thus, in $2, the speaker has addressed the relevance by producing a definite contextual effects to enhance the certainty of a proposition.
Discussion and conclusion
In summary, we have demonstrated through tracing detailed examples that an integrated model of discourse does encompass discourse structures and intentions. We also take an objective approach in arguing so, since we do not predefine any framework to demonstrate our thesis; Rather. we follow existing theories and by identifying the necessary bridging knowledge and int~erences, we just observe the integration emerging out of the individual discourse structures and intentions ;is defined in their native theories.
This integrative view is similar to others, e.g., (Grosz and Sidner, 1986) and (Moore and Pollack. 1992). Due to the lack of space, we did not deal with the full ranges of issues, but many of our positions are identical to others, in particular:
2. Many to many mapping exists between adjacent layers of the strata, e.g.. I)etween coh ('reHC,' and rhetorical relations for both text generation and interpretation 3. The nucleus and satellite, if exist, may not coincide between two adjacent layers.
What we have demonstrated in this paper is a particular (one-to-one) instance of a strata o[' discourse structure and intention. To be more specific, we demonstrate how a lexical cohesion gives rise to coherence relation; a coherence relation to a rhetorical relation; then to a speech act and a relevance maxim. In doing so, we feel we have extended the research in the following ways
• Address a wider range of strata; not only between coherence and rhetorical relations, but a.ll the way from lexical cohesions till relevance maxims;
• Formulate knowledge which explain the emergence of such connections between layers o[' discourse
The second point has been kept in the background in many previous research. For example, now it can be readily understood that an Exemplification coherence relation can give rise to an Evidence rhetorical relation. However, knowledge such as (KN-RR-1) is kept implicit; but upon closer inspection, it becomes obvious without such knowledge the connection between Exemplification and Evidence can not be established. Thus, flushing out the explanatory theory for the mapping between discourse strata has been identified as our most urgent research topic. In particular, th(, knowledge in the maxim level (KN-RM) is much in need of further study, especially with respe(l to other layers of the strata.
